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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Indus-
trial Commission erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim based upon 
a finding that the employer, a limited partnership, met the agri-
cultural employer coverage exception found in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983). 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
This case concerns a Writ of Review which is being taken 
from a denial of a Motion for Review by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah which affirmed the Order of an Administrative Law Judge 
dated March 22, 1985, wherein it was held that River Ranches, the 
uninsured employer, was an agricultural employer pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983), and, therefore, excempt 
from coverage under the Act* Tr. 265, 274. 
On April 17, 1984, Plaintiff, a 45-year-old male, was em-
ployed by River Ranches as a sheepherder. Tr. 36. On that date, 
while performing his normal duties as a sheepherder, Plaintiff 
was thrown to the ground by his horse. Tr. 37. As a result 
thereof, he sustained severe injuries to his right hip and leg. 
Tr. 38. 
At the time of the hearing on March 18, 1985, the parties 
stipulated on the record that River Ranches was the employer and 
that it was a limited partnership at the time Plaintiff was in-
jured. Tr. 28, 29, 36. In that partnership, Lloyd Johnson, 
Gerald Johnson and Burke Johnson are the general partners. Tr. 
28. The limited partners are Lloyd Johnson's wife and their five 
grandsons. Tr. 30, 264. 
On the date of the industrial accident, River Ranches unde-
niably employed at least four persons fffor the relevant period 
under consider at ion11 as defined by the Act. Tr. 264. Further-
more, Burke Johnson, one of the general partners, testified that 
in addition to these four (4) employees, others, namely himself, 
Burke Johnson and Gerald Johnson, were also employed during the 
relevant time but he was unsure as to whether they worked for the 
40 hours or more for a consecutive 13-week period as required by 
the statute. Tr. 71, 72. Moreover, he testified that another 
employee, Carlyle Bird, might also satisfy the work requirement 
of the Act. Tr. 68. Other than the uncertain and qualified 
testimony of Burke Johnson, these additional four people's work 
records were not made a part of the record. 
The purpose of the limited partnership is to conduct a live-
stock and cropping operation. Tr. 66. Income earned by the 
limited partnership is split approximately 50/50 between the 
livestock and the cropping operation. Tr. 66, 264. 
At the conclusion of Plaintifffs case, River Ranches de-
clined to present any testimonial or documentary evidence to 
rebut Plaintiff's case. Tr. 74. Instead, Defendant moved for an 
order dismissing Plaintiff's claim. Tr. 74. 
On March 22, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing Plain-
tiff's claim for benefits because "River Ranches is an agricul-
tural employer" as defined by statute. Tr. 264-265. Plaintiff's 
Motion for Review was denied and the Administrative Law Judges' 
order was affirmed by the Industrial Commission on April 24, 
1985, Tr. 274. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commission erred when 
it affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's Order dismissing 
Plaintiff's claim. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the 
employer, a limited partnership, failed to produce any evidence 
to rebut the presumption of coverage and did not satisfy the 
rigid exclusionary requirements for Workers1 Compensation cover-
age for agricultural employers contained in Utah Code Annotated, 
§35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983). Plaintiff further contends that the 
findings of the Industrial Commission are not supported by any 
substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, are arbitrary, 
improper, and contrary to law and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
AN EMPLOYER IS PRESUMED TO HAVE 
SECURED WORKERS1 COMPENSATION COVERAGE 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS EMPLOYEES 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act specifically provides 
that all employers must secure compensation. Utah Code Annotat-
ed, Section 35-1-46 (1977) provides three ways by which an em-
ployer may satisfy this requirement. This section also provides 
means for the Commission to take affirmative steps against any 
employer who fails to provide compensation and force an employer 
to comply with the requirements of the Act. In addition, crim-
inal liability lies against any employer who fails to comply with 
-3-
the prescriptions of this section. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-46 (1977) and all other 
provisions of the Utah's Workers1 Compensation Act, are in accocd 
with the basic features of Workers1 compensation, which have been 
succinctly described by Professor Larson as follows: 
[It] is a mechanism for providing cash-
wage benefits and medical care to victims 
of work connected injuries, and for plac-
ing the cost of the injuries ultimately 
on the consumer, through the medium of 
insurance, whose premiums are passed on 
in the cost of the product. Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §1, 
(1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently restated the purpose of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act in State Tax Commission v. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (1984) where the Court af-
firmed an award to an employee who sustained injuries in an auto-
mobile accident while she was on a special errand for her employ-
er. The Court stated: 
The purpose of the Workers' Compensation 
Act is to protect employees who sustained 
injuries arising out of their employment 
by affording financial security during 
the resulting period of disability. Id. 
at 1053. 
See also State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, Utah, 576 
P.2d 1297 (1978); Buhler v. Gossner, Utah, 530 P.2d 803 (1975); 
and Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 407 P.2d 692 (1965). 
When looking at the stated purpose of Workers' Compensation 
and the prescription of Section 35-1-46, it becomes clear that 
there arises a presumption of workers' compensation coverage. 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983) specifically provides 
that "every person, firm and private corporation" are employers 
subject to the provisions of the Act. Without such a presump-
tion, the generally acknowledged purpose of workers1 compensation 
as expressed by this Court would be defeated. Furthermore, the 
strict requirements placed upon an employer, and the powers con-
ferred upon the Commission by Section 35-1-46, would be absolute-
ly meaningless and merely an empty expression of legislative hope 
were the Act to be construed in any other manner. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that the legislature has provided 
means whereby this presumption may be rebutted by an employer; 
however, it is submitted in the instant case that the employer 
has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the presump-
tion of coverage applicable here. Hence, the employer should 
have provided for coverage in accordance with the terms and in-
tent of the law. 
II 
AN EMPLOYER WHO CLAIMS TO FIT WITHIN 
THE PARAMETERS OF THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION 
FOR COVERAGE CONTAINED IN THE ACT 
HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF CONCERNING 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXEMPTION 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983) provides 
in material part for an exemption to the general rule of coverage 
for certain agricultural employers as follows: 
Every person, firm and private corporation 
[constitute employers subject to the provision 
of this title] except agricultural employers 
who employ five or fewer persons other than 
immediate family members for 40 hours or more 
per week each employee for 13 consecutive 
weeks during any part of the preceding ll 
months (emphasis added). 
_ < ; _ 
This section provides for an exception to the general requirement 
that an employer provide workers1 compensation coverage for the 
benefit of his employees. Furthermore, this section, if its 
applicability is proven by sufficient evidence, provides a means 
to rebut the presumption of coverage. However, the burden of 
proof that the exemption is met rests squarely upon the employer 
who is attempting to escape the responsibility for injuries sus-
tained by an employee during the course of his employment. 
Another way to view this exception would be to look upon it 
as an affirmative defense to a claim for compensation made by an 
injured employee. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires a party to set forth any affirmative defenses when re-
sponding to a preceding pleading. Moreover, the party which sets 
forth such an affirmative defense must bear the burden of 
proof. TAtegstaff v. Remco, Inc. , Utah, 540 P.2d 931, 934 (1975). 
When applying this allocation of the burden of proof to the 
present case it becomes apparent that the employer did timely 
raise the affirmative defense. Tr. 16. However, and most im-
portantly, the employer failed to carry its burden of proof. 
Burke Johnson, one of the employer's general partners, testified 
that in addition to the Plaintiff, three other persons (not re-
lated to any of the partners) met the requirements of Section 35-
l-42(2)(b). Tr. 67-68, 265. In addition, Mr. Johnson testified 
that three other individuals also satisfied the time require-
ments , but he was unsure as to the specifics of their work rec-
ords. Tr. 72. This testimony was given during the Plaintiff's 
prima facie case. The employer further testified that another 
employee might also satisfy the time requirement. Tr., 68. None-
theless, the employer failed to offer any testimony or documenta-
tion to rebut any of the testimony given during Plaintiff's case 
and failed to conclusively establish that these other persons did 
not in fact also work the minimal period referred to in the 
Act. Defendant merely presented a large number of exhibits which 
supported the testimony given during the Plaintiff's case. 
Therefore, it is hereby submitted that Defendant failed to 
carry the burden of proving that Section 35-1-42(2)(b) excludes 
it from the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Ill 
THE PARTNERSHIP IS A SEPARATE 
EMPLOYING LEGAL ENTITY 
The Utah State Legislature, by enacting Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 48-2-1 (1953, as amended) et_ seq. as part of the Utah 
Code, has long recognized the existence of a limited partnership 
as a separate entity. Palle v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 7 
P.2d 284, 287-288 (1932). Professor Larson in his treatise on 
Workers' Compensation Law, Section 54.31 (1982) acknowledges and 
recognizes the separate entity issue and the obstacles presented 
thereby. 
The impact of the no-entity problem has been 
confined almost entirely to the type of case 
in which a partner is the claimant, for it is 
in such cases that the almost inseparate con-
ceptual obstacle is encountered of having the 
same person appear as employer and employee. 
But when this employer-employee merger is not 
involved, the courts have usually managed to 
get around the entity difficulty. To do this, 
it is only necessary to say that the intention 
of compensation legislation was to treat the 
partnership as an entity in order to effectu-
ate its beneficient purposes. Id. 
Applying Professor Larson's reasoning to the present case, 
it becomes obvious that the conceptual obstacle of the employer-
employee merger does not exist here. The uncontroverted facts 
support the conclusion that Plaintiff was employed by River 
Ranches, a limited partnership, at the time he sustained his 
industrial injury. Tr. 18, 265. The testimony given during 
Plaintiff's prima facie case also established that Plaintiff was 
not a partner in River Ranches. Tr. 28, 30, 264. Based upon 
these facts, this Court should not have any difficulty in treat-
ing River Ranches, a limited partnership, as a separate employing 
entity for the purpose of awarding benefits to him. 
IV 
THE EMPLOYER DID NOT SATISFY 
THE EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED 
IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-42 (1983) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 (2) (1983) provides 
that every person, firm and private corporation shall constitute 
employers subject to the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
... except agricultural employers who meet any 
one of the following conditions: (a) whose 
employees are all members of the immediate 
family of the employer, which employer has a 
proprietary interest in the farm; provided 
that the inclusion of any immediate family 
member under the provisions of this title is 
at the option of the employer or (b) who em-
ploy five or fewer persons other than immedi-
ate family members for 40 hours or more per 
week per each employee for 13 consecutive 
weeks during any part of the preceding 12 
months. 
When Plaintifffs claim was dismissed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, that dismissal was based upon the finding that the 
employer was "an agricultural employer as defined by Section 35-
1-42". Tr. 265. Because sub-section (a) requires that all em-
ployees be members of the immediate family, and River Ranches 
employed individuals who were clearly not related to the Johnson 
families, the employer claimed that it met sub-section (b) only 
and not sub-section (a). It is hereby submitted, however, that 
in any event such a finding is not supported in the record. 
First, as a separate entity, River Ranches cannot have an 
"immediate family member11. It is a thing, an inanimate entity 
incapable of procreation. It would be an unacceptable stretch of 
the everyday meaning of the term "immediate family member" to 
suggest that a limited partnership could have a spouse or a 
child. Though not applicable to this case, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 7-9-3(4) (1983) defines that term to mean "parents, 
spouse, surviving spouse, children ...." See also Bogart v. 
Deseret News Publishing Co., Utah, 233 P.2d 355, 357 (1951) where 
this Court held that an adult son, who maintained his own house-
hold and did not depend on his father for support, was not consi-
dered to be an immediate family member of the father. Therefore, 
the Johnson general and limited partners cannot be considered 
"immediate family members" such as would exclude them from the 
computation of the number of the employees of the employer. 
Second, it is undisputed that River Ranches employed four 
persons who unquestionably satisfied the work period contained in 
the Act. Tr. 264. In addition, Burke Johnson testified that 
_Q_ 
three other persons, and perhaps a fourth person, also satisfied 
said time condition, Tr. 68-72. Since none of the testimony 
relating to the persons employed was controverted at the time of 
the hearing, it is obvious that the Commission's Order was in 
error and must be reversed. The record, therefore, contains 
uncontroverted testimony that River Ranches employed seven, and 
perhaps eight, persons who satisfied the relevant period of time 
under consideration. 
And third, the generally recognized rule of law that a part-
ner cannot be classified as an employee of his partnership for 
Workers' Compensation purposes was designed to apply in cases 
only where there is a merger, i.e., the employer and the injured 
employee are the same person. 81 Am Jur.2d, "Workmen's Compensa-
tion", Section 176 (Supp. 1984-1985). This is, however, an ex-
ception to the general rule. One such exception involves "work-
ing partners" who receive wages in addition to a share of the 
profits, and their wages are included in the payroll. Larson, 
supra at Section 54.30. 81 Am. Jur.2d, supra. This exception 
most clearly applies to the three partners who work for River 
Ranches. Tr. 71 . 
V 
GIVEN THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION TO BE AFFORDED 
TO THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, ANY DOUBT 
CONCERNING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER 
MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
One of the overriding principles which must govern adjudica-
tion of Workers' Compensation claims is that such claims are to 
be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, and any 
doubts raised must be resolved in favor of the injured worker. 
.in. 
Prows v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363-1364 
(1980), citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 
184 P. 1020, 1021-1022 (1919), The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 590 P.2d 328, 
332 (1979) (dissenting opinion). McPhie v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977). Askren v. Industrial Com-
mission, 15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302, 304 (1969). M & K Corpor-
ation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134 
(1948). Plaintiff respectfully requests all doubt concerning the 
applicability of the Workers1 Compensation Act to River Ranches 
be resolved in such a way as to be consistent with the remedial 
nature of Workers1 Compensation finding the mandatory coverage of 
the Act applicable to it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission in this case has incorrectly held that the 
employer, a limited partnership, has satisfied the conditions of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 (2) (b) (1983) which in 
certain limited cases exempts an agricultural employer from the 
requirements of the Workers1 Compensation Act. This exemption is 
contrary to the general purpose of this Act and hence, an employ-
er seeking the benefits of the exemption must come forth with 
sufficient evidence to clearly establish the applicability of the 
exemption. River Ranches, however, has failed to present suffi-
cient evidence to support its assertion that the exemption 
applies in this case. 
Nonetheless, the Commission, in dismissing the Plaintiff's 
claim, found that all partners of River Ranches are related to 
Lloyd Johnson, and further found that River Ranches employed only 
four persons other than immediate family members• Tr . 265, 274. 
These findings, however, can only be based on the erroneous con-
clusion that Lloyd Johnson was the employer when, in fact, 
Plaintiff has demonstrated beyond any doubt that River Ranches 
was the employer of which Lloyd Johnson was merely a general 
partner . 
Plaintiff has also cited the renowned Professor Larson, and 
cases of this Court, who has recognized that for purposes of 
Workers1 Compensation a partnership is a separate entity. In 
fact, Professor Larson has reported in his treatise that courts 
uniformly hold that a partnership is a separate entity when a 
claimant is not related to any partner. Once this general rule 
is accepted, it becomes obvious that River Ranches can never 
satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 
(2) (b) (1983) for at least two reasons: first, an entity is 
incapable of having "immediate family members11; and second, 
Plaintiff in his prima facie case introduced testimony that at 
least seven, and possibly eight, persons satisfied the minimum 
work requirements of the section in any event. 
As this Court has said in State Tax Commission, supra, and 
the cases cited therein and many other cases, the Utah Workers1 
Compensation Act was intended to protect employees who sustain 
injuries arising out of their employment. With this intent in 
mind, the Industrial Commission's Order dismissing Plaintiff's 
claim in this case must be reversed and remanded for analysis of 
the medical and damages aspects of his claim. 
10 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1985/ 
v :NIUS DABMEY,|<: 
Attoriieys for Plaintiflf 
J 
1 O 
ADDENDUM 
- 1 A -
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(2) (1983) 
[Employer Coverage Exception Defined] 
The following shall constitute employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school dis-
trict in the state. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including 
every public utility, having in service one or more workmen or 
operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, except agricultural employers who 
meet any one of the following conditions: (a) whose employees are 
all .members of the immediate family of the employer, which em-
ployer has a proprietary interest in the farm; provided that the 
inclusion of any immediate family member under the provisions of 
this title is at the option of the employer or (b) who employ 
five or fewer persons other than immediate family members for 40 
hours or more per week per each employee for 13 consecutive weeks 
during any part of the preceding 12 months; and except domestic 
employers who do not employ one employee or more than one em-
ployee at least 40 hours per week; provided, that employers of 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right 
to come under the terms of this title by complying with the pro-
visions thereof and the rules and regulations of the commis-
sion. 
.1^-
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all em-
ployers in the usual course of the trade, business, provision or 
occupation of the employer, whether continuous through the year 
or for only a portion of the year. 
_1A_ 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 8500019 
ARTHUR J. BARTON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
RIVER RANCHES 
(Uninsured) 
Defendants, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * : * * * ' 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 18, 
1985 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant was present and represented by K. L. Mclff, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the Conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the defendant, by and 
through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the application for hearing, for the 
reason that the defendant was a agricultural employer pursuant to Section 
35-1-42 (b) , Utah Code Annotated. The motion was taken under advisement by 
the Administrative Law Judge. Being fully advised in the premises, the 
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the following. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This case concerns whether or not River Ranches, is an agricultural 
employer as provided in Section 35-1-42 (b), Utah Code Annotated. 
River Ranches, is a limited partnership, which was formed by Lloyd 
Johnson. Mr. Johnson being the father of his two general partners and sons, 
Gerald Johnson and Burt Johnson. In turn, the limited partners of River 
Ranches consist of Lloyd Johnson's wife, Melva, and his five grandsons. River 
Ranches, consists of the Lost Creek Farm which is a feed and sheepherding 
business. Approximately 50% of the income is derived from the growing of 
cattle feed, and other of their income is derived from sheepherding. The 
applicant herein, Arthur Barton, commenced employment with River Ranches as a 
sheepherder in March of 1984. At that time, there were two other sheep 
-17-
ARTHUR J. BARTON 
FINDING OF FACT 
PAGE TWO 
herders working for River Ranches, Mark Barton, the applicant's brother, and 
Cameron Connor. In addition, Richard Boyack worked in the shed, thereby 
making a total of four employees. In reviewing the extensive records 
submitted by the defendant, the Administrative Law Judge finds that on April 
17, 1984 there were a total of four employees other than immediate members of 
the family working for River Ranches, with the applicant being one of that 
four. 
The pertinent statutory provisions, in Section 35-1-42, which 
provides in Subsection (2): "every person, firm and private corporation,... 
except agricultural employers... (b) who employ five or fewer persons other 
than immediate family members for forty hours or more per week per each 
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the proceeding twelve 
mo n t h ^• 
that the general partners and the limited partners of River Ranches are all 
members of Mr. Lloyd Johnson's immediate family. Further, I find that River 
Ranches employed four persons other than immediate family members for the 
relevant period under consideration, and accordingly they are an agricultural 
employer as defined by Section 42 of the Act, and as such are not required to 
have wokers' compensation insurance coverage. 
COKCLl«^TOo" CF LAW: 
River Ranches is an agricultural employer pursuant to Section 35-1-42 
(2) (b), Utah Code Annotated. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Arthur J. Barton should be, 
and the same is hereby dismissed for the reason that his employer, River 
Ranches, is an agricultural employer as defined in Section 35-1-42, and as 
such is not required to have workers' compensation insurance. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors ana ODjections, and uniess so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
22 day of March, 1985 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that on March 22 , 1985 a copy of the attached 
Finding of Fact Conclusion of Law and Order was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Arthur J. Barton, 305 North 400 West, Salina, Utah 84654 
irginius Dabney, Attorney, 412 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 
K. L. Mclff, Attorney, P.O. Box 605, Richfield, Utah 84701 
River Ranches, Aurora, Utah 84620 
By Barbara 
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ-
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Applicant 
Kearns Building - Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (301) 328-9000 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY 
ARTHUR J. BARTON, 
Applicant, 
-vs-
RIVER RANCHES [Uninsured Employer], 
Defendant, 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 8500019 
COMES NOW Applicant, pursuant to the Utah Rule of Civi l Procedure and 
the Rule of the Indus t r i a l Ccamission of Utah, inter a l i a , and moves the 
Commission for an Order reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
dated March 22, 1985 wherein he held that the uninsured Defendant was an 
ag r i cu l tu ra l employer within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §35-1-^2 (2) 
(b) (1983) . A Manorandum in Support w i l l be f i led on or before Friday, ADril 
19, 1985. 
DATED th i s 4th day of Apri l , 1985 
VIR&Ht^^/DABNEY"ESO. \j 
.icbnd Attorneys (for Appl 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docu-
ment vvas mailed, postage pre-paid, on this the 4th day of April, 1985 to the 
following; 
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K. L. Mclff, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 605 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Mr. Arthur J . Barton 
305 North 400 West 
Salina, Utah 84654 
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ. 
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 DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Applicant 
3
 Kearns Building - Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
4
 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
_ Telephone: (801) 328-9000 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY 
ARTHUR J. BARTON, 
Applicant, 
-vs-
RIVER RANCHES [Uninsured Employer], 
Defendant. 
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kBNEY & D A B N E Y 
INS BUILDING, SUITE 412 
J SOUTH MAIN STREET 
LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 ««,0 0 « . 
PHONE ( 301 ) 323-9000 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 8500019 
On March 22, 1985 the Administrative Law Judge denied the claim of Arthur 
J. Barton for the reason that his employer was exempt from the workers* 
compensation statutory scheme as an agricultural employer pursuant to U.C.A. 
§35-1-42 (1983). The employer was a limited partnership consisting of Floyd 
Johnson, his wife, two sons and five grand^ess. River Ranches, a limited 
partnership was the anployer of the Claimant. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized the general rule that a partnership is a separate entity. Palle v. 
Industrial Carmission, Utah, 7 P.2d 284, 287-288 (1932). Professor Larson in 
his treatise, Workmens1 Compensation Law, §54.31 (Supp. 1984-1985), recognizes 
the problem of the separate entity issue when partnerships are involved in 
workers1 compensation claims. However, Professor Larson notes that this 
problem is "... confined to the type of case in which a partner ... is the 
claimant [and] it is in such cases that the almost insuperable conceptual 
1 
9 ijobstacle is encountered of having the same person appear as employer and 
Q isnployee." Id. However, when the employer/employee merger is not involved, 
3 | ! ~ ~ 
. I [Professor Larson points out that the courts have no di f f icul ty in t reat ing the 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
partnership as an entity to effectuate the general beneficient purpose of 
workers' compensation legislation: 
A fortiori, when the Claimant is simply an employee of 
the partnership unrelated to any partner, courts have 
uniformly held that the partnership is a separate employ-
ing entity. _Id_. 
Therefore, the general rule is that, for purpose of workers' compensation, a 
[partnership is a separate employing entity. 
j And, furthermore, an entity, such as a partnership or corporation, can 
j 
have neither a spouse nor an "immediate family mmber11 - only a person can 
;have those familial re la t ionships . Because River Ranches, a limited 
s 
ipartnership, was the Employer of Claimant, it cannot as a matter of law have 
any relations. Though the general and limited partners were all related to ; t 
1 R • 
peach other, none of them were or could be related to the Employer. 
17 i' 
'! The general law recognized by most jurisdictions is that a partner cannot 
1 8 | | 
jibe classif ied as an employee of his partnership for workmen's compensation 
19 il 
;'purposes. The conceptual obstacle which is encountered, as described above, 
20 U 
His that the same person assumes the role of employer and employee. Id. A 
21 -i 
ppartner cannot be both employer and employee of his firm. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, 
22 ' 
^"Workmen's Compensation'1, §176 (Supp. 1984-1985). However, there are 
2 3 ji 
^exceptions to this general rule. 
24 ^  
j! The primary exception to the general rule involves "working partners11 who 
25 !^ 
llreceive wages in addition to a share of the prof i t s , and their wages are 
26 V 
i (included in the payroll . Wor kmens' Canpens at ion, supra at §54.30. 81 An. 
: j u r . 2d, supra. 
28 ' • 
-23-
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Mi 
|j Hence, if the limited partners of River Ranches contributed their ser-
vices to the partnership and received compensation for those services, then 
3 ! i 
they, arguably were employees of the partnership. In Leventhal v. Atlantic 4 ! 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Rainbow Painting Co,, 172 A.2d 710, 712 (1961), the Court recognized that a 
[statutory limited partnership is an entity separate and apart from its part-
hners. As such, the limited partnership acting through its manager, could have 
1 
a family member counted as an ordinary employee• 
I It is submitted that the Defendant, River Ranches, failed to present 
1 0 ^sufficient evidence which supports the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion 
-- 'Ithat River Ranches is entitled to the agricultural employer exemption defined 
-^ |!in the statute. Because River Ranches admitted that four of its employees who 
-o jwere also not related to the Johnson family, worked more than the time 
14 
15 
i i 
• 'provided by statute, and, in addition and significantly, also admitted that 
various Johnson family members also worked at River Ranches and received 
«Q | remuneration over the applicable period of time, it is respectfully submitted 
^y |;that the Employer did not satisfy its burden of proof in establishing that it 
i i 
ig j|did not employ 6 or fewer people for the minimim periods provided by 
ig : statute. The testimony given by Mr. Johnson at the hearing clearly 
20 i established the possibility of six or more workers as having worked during the 
2i ^ applicable period and for the periods of time provided for in the statute, all 
22 of which renders River Ranches an Employer within the meaning of the Workers' 
23
 ;Compensation Statutes. 
24 ;j It is also significant to note that River Ranches failed to introduce any 
25 ^ testimony or documentary evidence in its case in chief to support its position 
25 ithat the exemption to the statute applied to River Ranches. Exemptions to 
27 ;tnandatory statutory coverage are always strictly construed against those 
28 claiming the exemption, because of the remedial nature of workers' 
-24-
1 !! 
compensation leg is la t ion . As a r e su l t , River Ranches clearly bore the burden 
!of proof of establishing the appl icabi l i ty of the exemption to i t in th is 
case , and because of the open-ended nature of Mr. Johnson's testimony, failed 
5 I jlto sustain that burden. 
6 I 
ii 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a party set 
7 |jforth any affirmative defenses when responding to a preceding pleading. The 
ii 
' ilparty raising an affirmative defense bear the burden of proof. Wagstaff v. 
o i i 
9 
10 
franco, Inc., Utah, 540 P.2d 931, 934 (1975). 
! River Ranches failed to present sufficient evidence at the hearing to 
.... i'support its position that it was entitled to the exemption of Section 42. 
i 
1 0 ii CONCLUSION 
12 |j The uncont rover ted facts are that River Ranches is a limited partnership, 
11 
! ; 
14!;and that it was the employer of Claimant at the time he sustained his i! 
1 j- !-industrial injury. As a limited partnership, it cannot have a spouse nor |j 
^ g jiimmediate fanily member and therefore cannot be identified as an agricultural 
1 y | [employer within the meaning of the Workers1 Compensation exemption set forth 
ig j;in Section 42. And finally, it is also submitted that River Ranches failed to 
ig imeets its burden of proof in that regard as w^ 
20 j 
21 J! 
22 i; 
23 i! 
DATED this 24th day of April, 1985 
24 n 
25 ji 
26 n 
27 !i 
VIRGINHUS BASNET, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Applicant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILlfC 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docunent 
23 was mailed, postage pre-paid, on this the 24th day of April, 1985 to the 
-25-
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II 
4 i i 
6|j 
6 | 
s i ! 
9j| 
io | ; 
1 1 !: 
i i 
i | 
12 |l 
1 3 | j 
I! 
1 4 j | 
15 P 
1 6 j | 
17 j ! 
18J ! 
19jj 
20 jj 
21 || 
22 ;! 
23;; 
24 jj 
25;! 
26 jj 
27; | 
' I 
28 : j 
following: 
K. L. Mclff, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 605 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Mr. Arthur J . Barton 
305 North 400 West 
Salina, Utah 84654 
Attorneys for Applicant 
! i 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 8500019 
* 
ARTHUR J. BARTON, * 
* 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF 
* 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
RIVER RANCHES, * 
(UNINSURED) * 
Defendants. * 
* 
On or about March 22, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above entitled 
case. 
On or about April 4, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge dated March 22, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
-27-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April_ _, 1985, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Arthur J. Barton, 305 North 400 West, Salina, UT 84654 
Virginius Dabney, Atty., 412 Kearns, Bldg., SLC, UT 84101 
K. L. Mclff, Atty., P. 0. Box 605, richfield, UT 84701 
River Ranches, Aurora, UT 84620 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Wilma 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
dociment, postage prepaid, on this the 19th day of August, 1985, to the fol-
lowing : 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
Attorney General of the State of Utah 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
K. L. Mciff, Esq. 
JACKSON, MclFF, & MOWER 
Post Office Box 605 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-5441 
, „_r,.r« DABNEY1, "E!= 
AttdtneVs for Plkint'iff 
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